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Abstract—We study cascading failures in a system comprising interdependent networks/systems, in which nodes rely on other nodes
both in the same system and in other systems to perform their function. The (inter-)dependence among nodes is modeled using a
dependence graph, where the degree vector of a node determines the number of other nodes it can potentially cause to fail in each
system through aforementioned dependency. In particular, we examine the impact of the variability and dependence properties of node
degrees on the probability of cascading failures. We show that larger variability in node degrees hampers widespread failures in the
system, starting with random failures. Similarly, positive correlations in node degrees make it harder to set off an epidemic of failures,
thereby rendering the system more robust against random failures.
Index Terms—Cascading failures, interdependent systems.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Many systems providing critical services to modern soci-
eties (e.g., smart grids, manufacturing systems, transporta-
tion systems) comprise multiple heterogeneous systems that
support each other to enable the functionality of the overall
system. In particular, (local) decision makers or subsystems
belonging to different constituent or component systems
(CSes) rely on each other to perform various functions.
For instance, a modern power system not only includes an
electrical grid/network, but also depends on an information
and communication network (ICN) to monitor the state
of the electrical network and to communicate and execute
appropriate control actions based on the observed state.
Throughout the paper, we refer to the (local) decision
makers or subsystems in various CSes simply as agents. In-
tricate (inter-)dependence among agents in CSes makes the
analysis of these complex systems challenging. Moreover, in
some cases, (random or targeted) failures of a small number
of agents in one CS have potential to cause unexpected,
widespread failures of many agents in multiple CSes.
The 2003 blackout in Italy provides a good example [38].
The onset of the blackout was triggered by an initial failure
in the power grid, which caused a disruption to both the
power grid and the ICN used for communication between
power substations. This secondary failure in ICN further
hampered the communication between stations and their
regulation, setting off rapid cascading failures throughout a
large part of the power grid.
As illustrated by this example, due to increasing re-
liance of modern societies on such complex systems and
interdependence among CSes, there is a growing interest
in modeling and understanding the interaction between
(agents in) interdependent CSes and the robustness of the
overall systems (e.g., [1], [2], [7], [12], [20], [38], [41], [42],
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[43], [46]). Yet, there is no theory that allows us to answer
even a basic question, “Given two different interdependent
networks or systems, when can we say that one network or system
is more robust than the other?”
The overarching goal of our study, which complements
those of existing studies (summarized in Section 2), is to
contribute to the emerging theory on complex systems,
in particular on the influence of the dependence structure
properties between agents on the robustness of the systems
with respect to localized, random failures in CSes. Our hope is
that the findings will help engineers and researchers identify
critical properties of robust systems and incorporate them
into design guidelines of complex systems.
To this end, we develop a general model for captur-
ing the propagation of failures from one agent to another
both within individual CSes and across multiple CSes. This
model is similar to that of [21] and allows us to introduce
asymmetric dependence among agents belonging to heteroge-
neous systems (e.g., electrical network vs. ICN) and to study
different ways in which failures can proliferate through
diverse CSes.
Some key questions we are interested in are: (a) When is
it possible for a localized initial failure in one CS, beginning
with one or a small number of randomly chosen agents,
to trigger a cascade of failures not only within the CS
in which the initial failure originated, but also in other
CSes? (b) How does the underlying dependence structure
among the agents in various CSes influence the dynamics
of failure propagation and the likelihood of such cascading
failures? (c) How can we identify susceptible CSes that are
more likely to set off widespread failures across many CSes,
starting with a few initial failures in the CSes? In this study,
we aim to offer partial answers to these important questions.
While we carry out the study in the framework of
propagating failures in interdependent systems, we suspect
that the basic model and approach as well as some of
key findings can be extended to other applications with
appropriate changes. These applications include (i) informa-
tion or rumor propagation or new technology adoption via
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2multiple social networks, (ii) an epidemic of disease across
multiples geographic locations (e.g., cities or countries), and
(iii) spread of malware in the Internet.
1.1 Summary of main results
We model the (inter-)dependence among agents with the
help of what is known in the literature as a degree-based
model or Chung-Lu model [10]. A similar model is used in
many existing studies, e.g., [6], [7], [22], [44], [46]. In order
to capture different manners in which failures can spread
both within various CSes and between CSes, we model the
dynamics of failure propagation using a multi-type branching
process with the assumption that there are no cycles in the
set of failed agents in a local neighborhood.
We call other agents which an agent can influence and
cause to fail its (dependence) neighbors, and model the number
of neighbors that an agent has in each CS, using a random
degree vector. The j-th element in the degree vector of an
agent belonging to the i-th CS (i 6= j) is the number of
agents in the j-th CS which are dependent on the CS i agent.
Given fixed distributions of degree vectors for agents
in different CSes, the tools from multi-type branching pro-
cess theory are employed to estimate the probability that
a random initial failure in the i-th CS will give rise to
cascading failures, affecting a large number of agents across
the system. Since this probability of suffering an epidemic
of failures depends on which CS suffers the initial failure,
it also tells us which CSes are more vulnerable to random
failures than others.
The primary goal of our study is to investigate how
(i) the variability of agents’ degrees (in the aforementioned
random degree vectors) and (ii) the dependence structure of
the degrees influence the likelihood of a random failure in a
CS sparking a chain of failures throughout the system with
many agents. To achieve this goal, we adopt well-known
(integral) stochastic orders that are partial orders on the set
of degree distributions [32], [40]. They allow us to compare
degree distributions of interest to us with respect to degree
variability and (positive) dependence.
There are many other important properties, such as
assortativity [34], [35] and clustering [11], [46] often ob-
served in social networks or engineered systems as well as
community structure [29], which influence the dynamics of
information or failure propagation. But, as it will be clear,
even without these properties, analyzing the role of degree
variability and dependence is technically challenging. For
this reason, we do not model them here and leave an
investigation of their effects for a future study. For instance,
clustering is shown to impede global cascades in multiplex
networks [46], and thus the probability of cascades we
estimate here may serve as an upper bound when there is
clustering. However, we suspect that the qualitative findings
reported in this study will continue to hold even in the
presence of clustering.
The high-level messages of our analytical findings can
be summarized as follows.
F1. Compare two distinct systems with different degree
distributions of agents. Then, when there are a small num-
ber of random failures in some CS, the system in which
agents’ degrees exhibit higher variability is less likely to suffer
widespread failures. In particular, suppose that agents have
identical or similar average degrees (hence comparable levels
of dependence among agents and CSes) in two different
systems. In this case, the system with more homogeneous or
predictable degrees (thus less variability in agents’ degrees)
is more susceptible to extensive failures in the system.
F2. Consider two systems in which agents’ degree distribu-
tions have identical marginal distributions. Therefore, loosely
speaking, we can say that they display the same level of
(inter-)dependence. In this case, the system in which the
agents’ degrees are more positively correlated is less likely to
experience cascading failures as a result of initially localized,
random failures.
The first finding indicates that degree distributions with
higher variability, such as power laws, which permit the ex-
istence of large degree hubs, are more robust to random fail-
ures than more concentrated distributions such as Poisson
distributions. Furthermore, it hints that systems in which all
agents in each CS have similar degrees are most prone to
an outbreak of failures. This observation is consistent with
earlier numerical studies (e.g., [8], [9]) that suggest that scale-
free networks with power law degree distributions are more
resilient to random attacks, but vulnerable to intentional
attacks that target high-degree nodes.
The second finding above may be somewhat counter-
intuitive at first sight. One might suspect that positive corre-
lations would be helpful to spreading failures because high-
degree agents are likely to have even larger aggregate de-
grees with increasing positive correlations and thus serve as
more effective conduits for transmitting failures. However,
our finding reveals that stronger positive correlations have
similar effects as higher variability in the first finding. We
suspect that the reason behind this is that stronger positive
correlations increase the variability in the aggregate degree
of agents. Consequently, they hinder the proliferation of fail-
ures, rendering the system more robust to random failures.
A few words on notation: throughout the paper, we
will use boldface letters or symbols to denote (row) vectors
or vector functions.1 For instance, d denotes a vector, and
the j-th element of d is denoted by dj . Vectors 0 and 1
represent the vectors of zeros and ones, respectively, of ap-
propriate dimensions. The set Z+ (resp. IN) denotes the set
of nonnegative integers {0, 1, 2, . . .} (resp. positive integers
{1, 2, 3, . . .}). Finally, all vector inequalities are assumed
componentwise.
2 RELATED LITERATURE
There is already a large volume of literature on related top-
ics, including cascading failures and robustness of complex
systems [1], [4], [5], [43], spread of epidemics and efficient
immunization [37], [39], [45], and information or rumor
propagation [11], [46]. Given the significant body of studies
in related fields, it is not possible to provide a summary
of all. For this reason, we limit our discussion to a short
list of most pertinent studies in the settings of multiplex or
interdependent networks, and do not discuss other relevant
studies (e.g., [2], [6], [14], [26], [29], [42]), including many
important studies on a single, monolithic network (e.g., [3],
1. All vectors are assumed to be row vectors.
3[8], [9], [11], [22], [30], [31], [34], [35], [44]), here. We instead
refer an interested reader to the references and those therein.
In [7], Buldyrev et al. investigated cascades of failures in
two interdependent networks – networks A and B – using
numerical studies. In their model, each node in network A
(resp. B) depends on a randomly chosen node in network B
(resp. A), which is modeled using a directed support link,
and the failure of the node on which a node depends causes
its own failure. Furthermore, nodes in network A (resp. B)
are connected with each other according to a degree distri-
bution PA (resp. PB). Initially, a fraction (1− p) of network
A nodes are removed, which triggers failures of nodes in
both networks through connectivity and dependence. They
studied the probability that a giant component survives
as a function of p, and identified a threshold for a first-
order phase transition. In addition, their numerical results
suggest that broader degree distributions PA and PB make
the network more vulnerable to random failures, whereas in
a single scale-free network, the opposite has been observed.
The findings in [7] have been extended in a series of
follow-up studies. Parshani et al. [36] studied a similar
model and demonstrated that, as the coupling between the
two networks diminishes, the phase transition changes to
a second-order transition (from a first-order transition). In
[41], Shao et al. relaxed the assumption that each node
is dependent on exactly one node in the other network
and modeled the number of support links of nodes using
random variables. Huang et al. [18] considered the robust-
ness of the system against targeted attacks by mapping
the problem to a previously studied problem with random
attacks, and suggested that the presence of high degree
nodes in scale-free networks makes it challenging to protect
interdependent networks against targeted attacks.
In [46], Zhuang and Yag˘an studied information propaga-
tion in a multiplex network with two layers representing an
online social network (OSN) and a physical network, both
of which have high clustering. Only a subset of vertices
in the physical network are assumed to be active in the
OSN. Their key findings are: (a) clustering consistently
hampers cascades of information to a large number of nodes
with respect to both the critical threshold of information
epidemics and the mean size of epidemics; and (b) informa-
tion transmissibility (i.e., average probability of information
transmission over a link) has significant impact; when the
transmissibility is low, it is easier to trigger a cascade of
information propagation with a smaller, densely connected
OSN than with a large, loosely connected OSN. However,
when the transmissibility is high, the opposite is true.
In another study [17], Hu et al. studied the problem of
viral influence spreading, for instance, in adoption of new
technologies or scientific ideas. They modeled the spread
of adoption using a multiplex network in which there are
two different types of links – (i) undirected connectivity
links and (ii) directed influence links. Outgoing influence
links of a node lead to other nodes whose adoption of a
new technology or idea causes the node to adopt it with
some fixed probability. Similarly, incoming influence links
of a node originate from other nodes that watch the node to
see if it adopts the technology or idea first and, if so, follow
its trend with fixed probability.
Their key findings include the following: (a) viral cas-
cades are feasible only if there are positive correlations
between the connectivity degrees and outgoing influence
degrees of nodes. The intuition is that when there are
positive correlations, even the adoption of a new technology
by some random node would make it easy to influence nodes
with high connectivity degrees because they tend to have
larger outgoing influence degrees, hence more likely to be
influenced by other adopters; and (b) positive correlations
between connectivity degrees and incoming influence de-
grees do not facilitate viral cascades much.
Khamfroush et al. [21] investigated the propagation of
phenomena (e.g., failures, infections or rumors) in interde-
pendent networks. By introducing temporal dynamics into
the model, they studied how quickly phenomena spread
in three different types of networks – scale-free networks,
small-world networks, and Erdo¨s-Re´nyi networks. Two of
key observations from their simulation studies are: (a) scale-
free networks are in general more conducive to spreading
phenomena than the other two types; and (b) the choices of
initial spreaders can have greater impact than the network
type. Based on the latter observation, they proposed a new
centrality metric, called path-degree centrality, to better
identify more effective initial spreaders.
While many of these studies (e.g., [7], [18], [36], [41])
examine the robustness of multiplex or interdependent net-
works, their approaches and goals are very different from
those of our study. First, most of the aforementioned studies
focus on the analysis of the emergence or survival of giant
components under the assumption that only the nodes that
belong to the giant component can continue to function
properly. We, on the other hand, investigate (i) when it is
possible to see an epidemic of failures through dependen-
cies among different systems and (ii) how the underlying
dependence properties between systems shape the likelihood
of such catastrophic failures.
Second, although the existing studies summarized here
(and others we are aware of) provide interesting observa-
tions and major contributions to the growing understanding
of complex systems, to the best of our knowledge, none of
these studies aims to present analytical findings that enable
us to compare the robustness of different networks on the
basis of their dependence properties (which can be partially
ordered). In contrast, as summarized in Section 1, our intent
is to take another step towards building a comprehensive the-
ory on complex systems which will help us determine when
the robustness of such systems improves or deteriorates as
a consequence of changes in their dependence properties.
Some of our preliminary results are reported in [24].
3 SYSTEM MODEL
Let NS > 1 be the number of CSes in the (global) system
we consider. For each i ∈ S := {1, 2, . . . , NS}, let Ai be the
set of agents in the i-th CS. When convenient, we use ai and
ai,k to denote a generic agent in CS i and the k-th agent in
Ai, respectively.
We model the internal or intra-CS interdependence
among agents in the i-th CS using a dependence graph
Gi = (Vi, Ei): the vertices in Vi are the agents in CS i.
The edges in Ei are undirected edges between vertices in Vi
and indicate mutual dependence relations between the end
4vertices.2 An undirected edge e ∈ Ei should be interpreted
as a pair of directed edges pointing in the opposite directions.
Two agents with an undirected edge between them are said
to be (dependence) neighbors.
In addition to the (undirected) edges between agents in
the same CS, we model the dependence of an agent in one
CS on another agent in a different CS using a directed edge;
if there is a directed edge from agent ai to agent aj , where
j 6= i, this means that aj depends on ai and, when ai fails,
it could cause aj to crash as well. We do not assume that
this dependence is mutual to allow asymmetric dependence
among CSes.3 If there is a directed edge ai → aj (j 6= i), we
say that aj is a CS j (dependence) neighbor of ai and that
ai supports aj .
We oftentimes need to distinguish the neighbors in the
same CS from those in other CSes. For this reason, we call
the neighbors in the same CS (resp. other CSes) internal
neighbors (resp. external neighbors). Note that an external
neighbor of an agent is another agent in a different CS which
it supports. In addition, we refer to the number of internal
neighbors of an agent as its internal degree.
3.1 Agent degree distributions
Throughout the paper, we shall use D = (Dj ; j ∈ S) to
denote aNS-dimensional (random) vector that describes the
number of neighbors that an agent has in each CS j ∈ S . In
other words, Dj , j ∈ S , is the number of CS j neighbors. We
call D the (dependence) degree vector of the agent. Note that,
for a CS i agent, its degrees Dj , j 6= i, represent the number
of agents that it supports in other CSes and hence can affect
in case of its own failure, but not those that support it. Thus,
they denote the outgoing degrees of the agent.
The degrees of a CS i agent are denoted by a ran-
dom vector Di = (Di,j ; j ∈ S) with a distribution pi;
given d ∈ ZNS+ , the probability that a randomly chosen
CS i agent has dj neighbors in CS j, j ∈ S , is equal
to pi(d). We find it convenient to define the marginal
distributions pi,j : Z+ → [0, 1], j ∈ S , where pi,j(dj) =
P [CS i agent has dj CS j neighbors].
Note that the degrees of an agent to different CSes are
not assumed to be mutually independent. Put differently, the
number of other agents that a CS i agent, say ai, supports
in different CSes, i.e., (Di,j ; j ∈ S \ {i}), could be correlated
and depend on its internal degree Di,i. This is important
because in practice the failure of an important agent in a
system may trigger the failure of many other agents across
different CSes, suggesting that the degrees of such agents
could be correlated. Thus, we wish to study the impact of
such degree correlations on system robustness.
Finally, throughout this paper (except for in Section 6),
we assume that the internal degree of an agent is at least one
with probability one, i.e., pi,i(0) = 0 for all i ∈ S ; otherwise,
the agent should not belong to CS i.
2. These dependence relations are not necessarily the physical links in
a network. For example, in a power system, an overload failure in
one part of power grid can cause a failure in another part that is
not geographically close or without direct physical connection to the
former.
3. Mutual inter-CS dependence can be handled by replacing the
directed edges with undirected edges similar to those used to model
the intra-CS interdependence, and vice versa, without affecting our key
findings. Also, a similar model is employed in [21].
3.2 Propagation of failures
To study the robustness of a system to failures, we need
to model how a failure spreads from one agent to another.
Here, we explain the models we employ to approximate
the dynamics of failure propagation both within a CS and
between agents in different CSes.
P1. Intra-CS failure propagation – We model failure propa-
gation within CS i with the help of a function ℘ini : IN
2 →
[0, 1]: for fixed d ∈ IN and 1 ≤ nf ≤ d, ℘ini (d, nf ) tells us
the probability that a CS i agent with an internal degree d
will fail when nf internal neighbors collapse.
An example that fits this model is the random threshold
model used by Watts in [44], which is also used in other
studies (e.g., [3], [6], [21]). In the Watts’ model, every agent
ai,k ∈ Ai has some intrinsic value ξi,k. These values ξi,k
of CS i agents are modeled using mutually independent
(continuous) random variables (rvs) with some common
distribution Fi. We refer to ξi,k as their security states.
In his model, a CS i agent, say ai, goes down as a con-
sequence of the failures of its internal neighbors when the
fraction of its failed internal neighbors exceeds its security
state ξi. Therefore, for a given pair (d, nf ) with nf ≤ d,
℘ini (d, nf ) is equal to P
[
ξi < nf/d
]
= Fi(nf/d).
P2. Inter-CS failure propagation – We model the propaga-
tion of a failure from one agent to an external neighbor in
a similar manner. Suppose that agent aj is a CS j agent.
Denote the number of CS i′ agents that support aj by Dinj,i′ .
We call Dinj,i′ the incoming CS i
′ degree of aj (to distinguish
it from its outgoing degree to CS i′).
Although our model can be generalized to allow the
failure probability of aj (as a result of failures of CS i agents
supporting aj) to be a function of all of its incoming degrees
(Dinj,i′ ; i
′ ∈ S \{j}) without altering our main results, for the
ease of exposition, here we adopt a simpler model in which
the failure probability only depends on Dinj,i: when a
j has
incoming CS i degree Dinj,i and n
i
f of these supporting CS i
agents collapse, the probability that aj also fails as a result
is given by some function ℘exj,i(D
in
j,i, n
i
f ). Also, we assume
that the external neighbors of a failed agent go down with
the prescribed probability independently of each other.
It is clear that this model is general enough to include the
one studied in [41], where aj is unaffected by the failure of a
supporting CS i agent as long as there is another supporting
CS i agent that is still operational.
3.3 Tree-like infection graphs
For our study, we focus on scenarios where collapsed agents
do not cause the failures of many neighbors on the average.4
To make this more precise, we introduce infection graphs:
starting with an initial failure of an agent in the system, the
infection graph consists of all failed agents and the directed
edges used to contribute to the failures of neighbors. In
other words, a directed edge from agent a1 to agent a2
belongs to the infection graph if and only if (iff) agent a2
4. When each failed agent triggers many other neighbors to crash as
well, cascading failures are likely and should happen often. This may
indicate that the system is poorly designed. Instead, we are interested
in more realistic scenarios of interest in which cascading failures are
possible and do occur, but not too frequently.
5is a neighbor of a1 and agent a1 failed before agent a2 did.
We assume that this infection graph can be approximated
using a tree-like structure, which we call an infection tree. A
similar assumption is introduced in [6], [22], [44], [45].
Although this assumption may not always hold in real
systems, it allows us to approximate the dynamics of
spreading failures as a multi-type branching process (de-
scribed in Section 5) and to carry out an analytical study.
Moreover, when a graph is sparsely connected in large
networks with small average degrees, with high probability
there are only few short cycles in the giant component [19].
Thus, it is a reasonable assumption when failed agents do
not cause the crash of a large number of neighbors in each
CS, which is the scenario of interest to us.
When there is a directed edge from agent a1 to agent a2
in an infection tree, i.e., the failure of a1 causes that of a2,
we refer to a1 (resp. a2) as the parent (resp. a child). Also,
borrowing from the language of epidemiology, we say that
the parent infected the child.
4 AGENT TYPES AND CHILDREN DISTRIBUTIONS
As mentioned in Section 1, we are interested in scenarios
where the number of agents in each CS is large. In a system
with many agents, the propagation of failures can be ap-
proximated with the help of a multi-type branching process
under some simplifying assumptions. To be more precise,
we shall borrow from the theory of branching processes
with finitely many types in order to study the likelihood
of a small number of initial failures leading to an epidemic
of failures infecting many other agents.
4.1 Agent types
In our model, depending on how an agent is infected,
there are two possible types we need to consider for the
failed agent. To formalize this, we define the types of agents
in varying CSes. Given NS CSes, there are 2NS types of
interest to us. A CS i agent (i ∈ S) can be either type i
or i + NS : a type i agent is a CS i agent whose internal
neighbors are all functional, i.e., have not crashed. On the
other hand, a CS i agent is of type i+NS if it has an internal
neighbor that went down. For notational simplicity, we use
i+ to denote i+NS (i ∈ S) hereafter.
We shall discuss the distribution of the number of chil-
dren of various types which are produced by a failed agent
of type i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2NS} =: S+ shortly. To explain these
children (vector) distributions, we first need to describe how
we approximate the probability that a neighbor of a failed
agent falls victim to infection.
4.2 Infection probability of neighbors
The assumption that the infection graph is tree-like has an
important implication: except for the root of the infection
graph, each failed agent has exactly one supporting agent
whose collapse led to its own failure, namely its parent. This
observation helps us simplify the models used to capture the
propagation of failures as follows.
Because an agent faces possible infection from at most
one failed supporting agent under the assumption, we can
approximate the probability that a neighbor of a failed
agent, say ai, will be infected as explained below.
• Intra-CS infection probability – Consider an internal
neighbor, a˜i, of agent ai. Following the explanation in [22],
[44], the probability that agent a˜i has d internal neighbors
is proportional to d · pi,i(d). Recall that a˜i with internal
degree d will be infected by the failure of ai with probability
℘ini (d, 1). Thus, by conditioning on the internal degree of
a˜i, the probability that an internal neighbor of a failed CS i
agent will be infected can be approximated using
qi,i :=
∑
d∈IN
d · pi,i(d)
di,avg
℘ini (d, 1) =
∑
d∈IN
wi,i(d) ℘
in
i (d, 1), (1)
where di,avg :=
∑
d∈IN d · pi,i(d) is the average internal
degree of CS i agents, and wi,i(d) := d · pi,i(d)/di,avg.
In the example of Watts’ model, we have qi,i =∑
d∈IN wi,i(d) Fi(d
−1).
The average internal degree di,avg in the denominator
of (1) serves as a normalizing constant so that wi,i :=
(wi,i(d); d ∈ IN) is the internal degree distribution of a
randomly picked internal neighbor [22], [44].5
• Inter-CS infection probability – Suppose that a CS
j agent, aj , is an external neighbor of a failed CS i agent
ai. Recall that the inter-CS dependence is asymmetric. Let
pinj,i be the conditional distribution of D
in
j,i given that a
j is
a CS j neighbor of a CS i agent. Then, we approximate the
probability that aj will be infected by the failure of ai using
qi,j :=
∑
d∈IN p
in
j,i(d) ℘
ex
j,i(d, 1).
Consider the model studied in [41] where the agent aj
survives as long as one other supporting CS i agent is
functional. In this case, agent aj will be infected by the
failure of ai iff Dinj,i = 1. In other words, ℘
ex
j,i(1, 1) = 1
and ℘exj,i(d, 1) = 0 for all d > 1. Thus, qi,j = p
in
j,i(1).
The conditional distribution pinj,i is determined by the
distribution of incoming degrees Dinj,i of CS j agents. In our
study, we assume that the incoming degree distributions,
hence their conditional distributions and qi,j , j 6= i, are
fixed while we study the influence of the variability and
dependence of internal and outgoing degrees of agents.
We believe that many of system parameters used in the
model can be estimated in practice, for instance, from his-
torical data, physical laws (e.g., power grid), or simulation
studies. These include degree distributions (pi; i ∈ S) and
infection probabilities (qi,j ; i, j ∈ S), and can be used to
examine the robustness of the system.
4.3 Distributions of children vectors
Let ai be a randomly picked CS i agent, and assume that
it crashes and infects some of its neighbors. Then, the type
of its child belongs to (S ∪ {i+}) \ {i} =: S+i : if ai triggers
the failure of an external neighbor in CS j, j 6= i, the type
of the child is simply j. If ai causes an internal neighbor to
fail, then the child’s type is i+ because agent ai is an infected
internal neighbor of the child.
Based on this observation, we can approximate the dis-
tribution of the number of children produced by ai by
considering its two possible types.
5. This sampling technique is called sampling by random edge selection
[27].
6C1. Type i agent ai (i ∈ S) – Let Di,i be its internal
degree. Some of these internal neighbors, however, may not
be affected by the failure of agent ai and remain uninfected.
Similarly, an external neighbor of agent ai in CS j will go
down (as a consequence of ai’s failure) with probability qi,j .
As a result, the actual number of CS j neighbors infected by
ai, which we denote byOi,j , can differ fromDi,j , j ∈ S\{i}.
Summarizing this argument, we approximate the prob-
ability that ai will produce children given by a children
vector o = (oj ; j ∈ S+) ∈ Z2NS+ , where oj is the number of
type j children, using the following children distribution:
hi(o) (2)
=

∑
d≥d¯(o)
(
pi(d)
×∏j∈S ( djd¯j(o)) (qi,j)d¯j(o) (q¯i,j)dj−d¯j(o) )
if oj = 0 for all j /∈ S+i ,
0 otherwise,
where qi,j are as defined earlier, q¯i,j := 1− qi,j for all j ∈ S ,
and d¯ : Z2NS+ → ZNS+ with
d¯j(o) =
{
oj if j 6= i,
oi+ if j = i.
(3)
C2. Type i+ agent ai – For type i+ agents (i ∈ S), the
children distribution is closely related to that of type i agents
with a minor difference: for o ∈ Z2NS+ ,
hi+(o) (4)
=

∑
d≥d¯(o)
(
pi(d+ ei)
×∏j∈S ( djd¯j(o)) (qi,j)d¯j(o) (q¯i,j)dj−d¯j(o) )
if oj = 0 for all j /∈ S+i ,
0 otherwise,
where ei is a zero-one vector whose only nonzero entry is
the i-th entry.
The only difference between (2) and (4) is that, for type
i+ agents, we first remove one of internal neighbors before
counting the neighbors that can be infected by the agents.
The reason for this is that a type i+ agent has a parent in CS
i and the number of remaining internal neighbors that it can
potentially infect is its internal degree minus one. We denote
the marginal distribution of the number of type j children
of a type i agent by hi,j , i, j ∈ S+.
Before we proceed, let us comment on a simplifying
assumption we implicitly introduced in Section 4.2 and
our approximations in (2) and (4). Suppose that ai is a
CS i agent that is infected by an internal neighbor. Given
that ai’s failure is caused by another internal neighbor, its
conditional degree distribution will likely be different from
pi we assumed in (2) and (4).
For instance, if d · ℘ini (d, 1) is increasing (resp. decreas-
ing), its internal degree Di,i conditional on the event that it
is infected by an internal neighbor, is larger (resp. smaller)
than the unconditional internal degree with respect to the
usual stochastic order [40]. The reason for this is that the
internal degree distribution of an internal neighbor of ai
is given by wi,i, where wi,i(d) ∝ d · pi,i(d). Therefore, if
d · ℘ini (d, 1) is increasing in d, we have
wi,i(d)℘
in
i (d, 1)
pi,i(d)
≤ wi,i(d+ 1)℘
in
i (d+ 1, 1)
pi,i(d+ 1)
for all d ∈ IN.
Moreover, this conditional degree distribution could dif-
fer from the conditional degree distribution we would see
provided that ai is infected by a parent in a different CS,
which would also depend on the CS to which the parent
belongs. Therefore, it is clear that the conditional degree
distribution of an infected agent will likely differ from pi
and depend on how it was infected.
Unfortunately, computing and adopting accurate condi-
tional degree distributions for the analysis is quite challeng-
ing for several reasons. For example, in order to compute
the necessary conditional probabilities, for each failed agent
ai, we need to know exactly how it was infected. More
precisely, we must take into account the history or the
sequence of agents that collapsed and led to the infection of
ai, as well as the joint distributions of agents’ incoming and
outgoing degrees. The reason for this is that the conditional
degree distribution of the parent of ai in turn depends on its
parent and so on.
Iteratively computing the conditional degree distribu-
tions of all infected agents while accounting for the history
and relevant joint degree distributions quickly becomes in-
tractable. For this reason, in order to maintain mathematical
tractability of the model, we make a simplifying assumption
that the (conditional) degree distribution of infected CS i
agents can be approximated by pi for all i ∈ S . However, we
believe that this is a reasonable assumption, especially when
we compare two systems with similar degree distributions
for local comparison (as the assumption or its failure would
affect both of them alike).
5 MULTI-TYPE BRANCHING PROCESS FOR MOD-
ELING THE SPREAD OF FAILURES
We approximate the propagation of failures, using a multi-
type branching process: when a type i agent (i ∈ S+) fails,
it produces children of various types in accordance with
the children distribution described in the previous section,
independently of other infected agents in the system.
5.1 Infection tree
Suppose that a CS i agent (i ∈ S), say ai, is the first agent
to experience a random failure. As mentioned in Section 1,
we are interested in determining: (i) if it is possible for this
single failure to lead to widespread infection of many other
agents through dependence among agents in multiple CSes,
and (ii) if so, how likely it is for the system to suffer such a
cascade of failures.
To answer these questions, we consider a (directed)
infection tree that captures the spread of failures, which is
rooted at agent ai. We denote the tree by T := (VT , ET ),
where VT is the set of failed agents and ET is the set
of directed edges via which failures transmitted. For each
k ∈ Z+, let N (k) = (Nj(k); j ∈ S+) denote the set of k-
hop neighbors of ai in T , where Nj(k) is the set of type j
k-hop neighbors.
Note that N (k), k ∈ IN, are random sets, and we are
mostly interested in the cardinalitiesNj(k) = |Nj(k)|. In the
example with three CSes (NS = 3) shown in Fig. 1, the initial
failure occurs in CS 2 (Root shown as a filled red circle). The
dotted arrows indicate how the failures transmitted between
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Fig. 1. Propagation of failures.
agents. Here, Nj(1) = 1 for j ∈ {1, 5} and Nj(1) = 0 for
j ∈ {2, 3, 4, 6}. Similarly, N4(2) = 2 and Nj(2) = 0 for
j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 5, 6}. The tree T consists of the root and infected
agents (filled orange circles) along with the dotted arrows.
Regrettably, computing the exact distribution of the total
number of failed agents (i.e., 1 +
∑
k∈IN
(∑
j∈S+ Nj(k)
)
) is
challenging, if possible at all, for large systems. For this rea-
son, we follow a similar approach employed in [6], [22], [44],
[45] and, rather than analyzing a finite system, consider an
infinite system in which the degree vector of each CS i agent
is given by a random vector with a common distribution pi,
independently of each other. In other words, the degree vectors
of CS i agents are given by independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) random vectors with the distribution pi.
Moreover, the degree vectors of agents in different CSes are
assumed mutually independent. This degree-based model
is also known as the Chung-Lu model in the literature [10].
By the strong law of large numbers, the fraction
of CS i agents with degree vector d converges to
pi(d) almost surely for all d ∈ ZNS+ . Using this
model, we will first look for a condition under which
P [lim supk→∞Nj(k) = 0 for all j ∈ S+] < 1. Put differ-
ently, there is positive probability that the failures will con-
tinue to propagate forever in an infinite system. We shall use
this probability of cascading failures (PoCF) in an infinite
system to approximate the probability that a large system
would experience an epidemic of failures.
The answer to this question can be obtained by studying
a multi-type branching process with 2NS types. Let N =
{N(k), k ∈ Z+}, where N(k) = (Ni(k); i ∈ S+) and
Ni(k), i ∈ S+, is the number of type i agents in the k-th
generation. Recall that, for i ∈ S , a type i agent (resp. i+
agent) is a CS i agent with no infected internal neighbor
(resp. with a failed internal neighbor).
5.2 Probability of extinction
The probability P [lim supk→∞Nj(k) = 0 for all j ∈ S+] is
called the probability of extinction (PoE) [15]. Obviously, the
PoCF is equal to one minus the PoE. Since the initial failure
can originate in any of NS CSes, we denote the PoE starting
with a random failure in CS i by µi.
For each i ∈ S+, let E [hi] = (E [hi,j ] ; j ∈ S+) be
a 1 × 2NS row vector, whose j-th element is the expected
number of type j children from a failed type i agent. Define
M = [Mi,j ] to be a (2NS) × (2NS) matrix, whose i-th row
is E [hi], i.e., Mi,j = E [hi,j ] for all i, j ∈ S+.
An example of M with NS = 2 is shown below.
M =
 0 M1,2 M1,3 0M2,1 0 0 M2,40 M3,2 M3,3 0
M4,1 0 0 M4,4

Note that Mi,i = Mi+,i = 0 for all i ∈ S because a CS i
agent infected by another CS i agent will be type i+ (i ∈ S).
Similarly, Mi,j+ = 0 for all i, j ∈ S and j 6= i under the
assumption of no cycles in the infection tree.
Definition 1. A square matrix A is said to be (positively)
regular if there exists k ∈ IN such that Ak is positive, i.e.,
all entries are positive.
Assumption 1. We assume that M is (positively) regular.
One can show that a sufficient condition for the (positive)
regularity of M is that (i) pi,i(0) + pi,i(1) < 1 for all i ∈ S
and (ii) M is irreducible.6 The first condition simply means
that when a CS agent i fails, there is positive probability that
it will infect another internal neighbor. The second condition
ensures that a random initial failure in any CS can eventually
cause some agents in every other CS j, j 6= i, to go down
with positive probability, following a sequence of infections.
If M is regular, there exists k? ∈ IN such that, starting
with any random failure, regardless of which CS experiences
the initial failure, there is strictly positive probability that
N(k?) ≥ 1, i.e., there is a failure in every CS.
Let µ = (µi; i ∈ S+). Although the PoEs of interest to us
are (µi; i ∈ S), we will compute (µi+ ; i ∈ S) as well. Under
the (positive) regularity assumption, µ = 1 if (i) ρ(M) < 1
or (ii) ρ(M) = 1 and there is at least one type for which the
probability that it produces exactly one child is not equal to
one, where ρ(M) is the spectral radius of M [16]. Similarly,
if ρ(M) > 1, then µ < 1 and there is strictly positive
probability that the cascading failures continue forever in an
infinite system, suggesting that there could be an epidemic
of failures in a large system.
It is noteworthy that whether or not there could be
cascading failures in the infinite system depends only on
the mean number of children of varying types that each
type produces. However, the exact PoEs µ vary from one
set of children distributions {hi; i ∈ S+} to another set
{h˜i; i ∈ S+} even when the matrix M remains the same.
For each i ∈ S+, define a generating function fi :
[0, 1]2NS → [0, 1], where
fi(s) =
∑
o∈Z2NS+
hi(o)
∏
j∈S+
s
oj
j .
Then, the PoE vector µ is given as a fixed point that satisfies
f(µ) = µ ≤ 1, (5)
6. Let A = [Ai,j ] be a 2NS×2NS matrix, whereAi,j = 1 {Mi,j > 0}
for all i, j ∈ S+. This matrix A can be viewed as an adjacency matrix
for a directed graph G with 2NS vertices that represent the 2NS types.
There is a directed edge from vertex i to vertex j if a type i agent
produces a type j agent with positive probability. The matrix M is
irreducible if and only if the directed graph G is strongly connected [13].
8where f(s) = (f1(s), . . . , f2NS (s)). When ρ(M) > 1, there
exists a unique µ that satisfies (5) with strict inequality, i.e.,
µ < 1 [15].
A key question of interest to us is how the degree
distributions (pi; i ∈ S) affect the PoE vector µ, especially
with fixedM. To be more precise, we will investigate how the
variability and dependence structure of agents’ degree vectors
shape the PoEs. To this end, we introduce several stochastic
and dependence orders that we employ to compare the
degree distributions. Using these orders, we first examine a
simple scenario consisting of two symmetric interdependent
CSes in the subsequent section, followed by more general
settings in Section 7.
6 TWO SYMMETRIC INTERDEPENDENT SYSTEMS
The goal of this section is, by studying simpler scenarios
first, to highlight some insights on how (i) the variability
of degrees of agents (i.e., the number of neighbors in two
different CSes) and (ii) the dependence of the two degrees
influence the PoEs, even when the mean degrees remain
fixed.
Consider a system comprising two interdependent CSes
(NS = 2), and suppose that the degree distributions p1
and p2 are symmetric, i.e., p1(d1, d2) = p2(d2, d1) for all
(d1, d2) ∈ Z2+. Moreover, in order to simplify the analysis
and shed some light on our main findings in general settings
to follow, we set qi,j = 1 for all i, j ∈ S . This assump-
tion will be relaxed in the subsequent section. To correctly
interpret this assumption and the findings in this section,
a reader should view the symmetric degree distributions
pi, i = 1, 2, as children distributions hi, i = 1, 2, instead;
otherwise, if all internal dependence graphs Gi, i ∈ S , are
connected and qi,j = 1 for all i, j ∈ S , under positive
regularity assumption of M, every agent will eventually
be infected, starting with any failure. For this reason, we
remove the assumption that the internal degree is at least
one in this section to allow for the possibility that some
agents do not produce any children. This assumption will
be reintroduced in the following section.
Throughout this and following sections, we assume that
ρ(M) > 1 under all considered degree distributions so that
it is possible for a random failure to trigger cascading fail-
ures. In the case of two interdependent CSes, the assumed
symmetry of the degree distributions and the uniqueness of
the fixed point µ satisfying f(µ) = µ < 1 tell us µ1 = µ2
and µ3 = µ4.
6.1 The effects of degree variability
We first study the variability of degrees. One common
way to compare the variability of two rvs is the second-
order stochastic dominance (SSD) [40]. Loosely speaking, if
rv Y dominates rv X with respect to SSD (X ≤SSD Y )
and E [X] = E [Y ], it means that Y is more predictable
than X . It turns out X ≤SSD Y is equivalent to X being
smaller than Y with respect to increasing concave (ICV) order
(X ≤icv Y ); for all increasing, concave functions ξ : IR→ IR,
E [ξ(X)] ≤ E [ξ(Y )].7 Since ξ(x) = x is concave and
increasing, X ≤SSD Y implies E [X] ≤ E [Y ].
In order to eliminate the effects of the correlations be-
tween two degrees and focus on the role of their variability
on PoEs, we assume that the two degrees of an agent are
independent in this subsection.
Assumption 2. p1(d1, d2) = p1,1(d1) ·p1,2(d2) for all d1, d2 ∈
Z+.
The following lemma illustrates how the variability in
degrees affects the PoEs when the degrees of an agent are
independent.
Lemma 1. Consider two degree distributions p(`)1 , ` = 1, 2.
Let D(`)1 , ` = 1, 2, be a random vector with distribution
p
(`)
1 . Suppose that Assumption 2 holds for p
(`)
1 , ` = 1, 2,
and D(1)1,j ≤SSD D(2)1,j for j = 1, 2. Then, µ2 ≤ µ1,
where µ` < 1, ` = 1, 2, is the PoE vector under degree
distribution p(`)1 .
Proof: A proof is provided in Section 8.1.
The lemma tells us that µ21 = µ
2
2 ≤ µ11 = µ12. Thus,
an implication of Lemma 1 is that even when the mean
degrees of agents are fixed, the PoEs tend to increase as the
degrees of agents become more spread out, i.e., have greater
variability, suggesting that widespread failures would be
less likely as the degrees of agents vary more widely.
We say that X is smaller than Y with respect to first-
order stochastic dominance (FSD) or usual stochastic order
if, for all increasing functions ξ : IR → IR, E [ξ(X)] ≤
E [ξ(Y )] [32], [40]. This is equivalent to FX(t) ≥ FY (t) for
all t ∈ IR. Clearly, by definition, FSD implies SSD. Hence,
D
(1)
1,j ≤FSD D(2)1,j , j = 1, 2, is a sufficient condition for
Lemma 1 to hold and, as one would expect, when agents’
degrees become larger, an outbreak of failures is more likely.
d1
d2
0 1 2 3
0 0.40000 0.12000 0.16000 0.01200
1 0.03750 0.01125 0.01500 0.01125
2 0.05000 0.01500 0.02000 0.01500
3 0.01250 0.00375 0.00500 0.00375
Degree distribution p(1)1 (d1, d2)
d1
d2
0 1 2 3
0 0.40000 0.04000 0.32000 0.04000
1 0.02500 0.00250 0.02000 0.00250
2 0.07500 0.00750 0.06000 0.00750
Degree distribution p(2)1 (d1, d2)
d1
d2
0 1 2 3
0 0.40000 0.04700 0.32000 0.03300
1 0.02500 0.00250 0.02000 0.00250
2 0.07500 0.00050 0.06000 0.01450
Degree distribution p(3)1 (d1, d2)
TABLE 1
Degree distributions p(`)1 , ` = 1, 2, 3.
Example 1: Consider two degree distributions p(1)1 and
p
(2)
1 shown in Table 1. Even though these distributions may
7. These inequalities in the definitions of various stochastic and
dependence orders are required to hold only for the functions for which
the expectations are well defined.
9not be realistic or representative, we use them to illustrate
our findings with numerical examples. One can easily verify
that (i) D(`)1,1 and D
(`)
1,2, ` = 1, 2, are independent and (ii)
D
(1)
1,j ≤SSD D(2)1,j , j = 1, 2. In addition, both distributions
yield
M =
 0 0.35 1.00 00.35 0 0 1.000 0.35 0.50 0
0.35 0 0 0.50

with ρ(M) = 1.021 > 1. The entropies of D(1)1 and D
(1)
2
(resp. D(2)1 and D
(2)
2 ) are 1.786 and 1.003 (resp. 1.461 and
0.884), respectively, suggesting that D(1)j , j = 1, 2, are more
unpredictable than D(2)j , j = 1, 2.
The PoE vector satisfying (5) for p(1)1 (resp. p
(2)
1 )
is µ1 = (0.9646 0.9646 0.9761 0.9761) (resp. µ2 =
(0.9586 0.9586 0.9720 0.9720)). Thus, although the two de-
gree distributions yield the same matrixM, the PoE is larger
under distribution p(1)1 . Equivalently, the PoCF, beginning
with a random failure in either CS, is 0.0354 (resp. 0.0414)
under p(1)1 (resp. p
(2)
1 ), which represents roughly a 17 percent
difference in PoCF.
6.2 The effects of degree dependence
We now turn our attention to the role of dependence be-
tween the two degrees of an agent. To this end, we adopt a
well-known dependence order, called concordance order (CO)
[32]: suppose that X = (X1, X2) and Y = (Y1, Y2) are two
bivariate rvs with identical marginal distributions. This means
that the variability of each rv remains fixed. Then, X is
smaller than Y in CO (X ≤C Y) if Cov(ξ1(X1), ξ2(X2)) ≤
Cov(ξ1(Y1), ξ2(Y2)) for all increasing functions ξj , j = 1, 2.
Note that this implies Cov(X1, X2) ≤ Cov(Y1, Y2).
Roughly speaking, X ≤C Y means that Yi, i = 1, 2, are
more positively correlated than Xi, i = 1, 2. In addition, as
explained in [32, p. 109], CO is the only integral stochastic
order that satisfies natural properties that one would expect
of a stochastic order for comparing dependence.
The second lemma examines how the (positive) depen-
dence of degrees influences the PoEs. Its proof is omitted
here due to a space constraint and can be found in [25].
Lemma 2. Consider two degree distributions p(`)1 , ` = 1, 2,
with identical marginal distributions. Let D(`)1 , ` = 1, 2,
be a random vector with distribution p(`)1 . Suppose
D
(1)
1 ≤C D(2)1 . Then, µ1 ≤ µ2, where µ`, ` = 1, 2, is
the PoE vector under the degree distribution p(`)1 .
A key finding of Lemma 2 is that as the two degrees of
agents become more positively correlated, it becomes more
difficult to set off cascading failures. One possible way to
interpret this finding is that as the degrees become more
positively correlated, the variability in the total degree of
an agent, i.e., the sum of two degrees, also grows. Hence,
Lemma 1 suggests that the PoEs should increase.
Example 2: For the second example, consider degree
distributions p(2)1 and p
(3)
1 given in Table 1. To obtain
p
(3)
1 , we modified p
(2)
1 in order to introduce weak positive
correlations between the two degrees by (i) adding 0.007
to p(2)1 (1, 0) and p
(2)
1 (3, 2) and (ii) subtracting 0.007 from
p
(2)
1 (3, 0) and p
(2)
1 (1, 2). The correlation coefficient of D
(3)
1,1
and D(3)1,2 is 0.0368, indicating weak positive correlations.
One can show that (i) p(2)1 and p
(3)
1 have the same
marginal distributions and (ii) D(2)1 ≤C D(3)1 . There-
fore, Lemma 2 tells us that µ2 ≤ µ3. Indeed, µ3 =
(0.9604 0.9604 0.9732 0.9732), which is larger than µ2
from the previous example. Accordingly, the PoCF decreases
from 0.0414 to 0.0396, which represents approximately a 4.5
percent reduction in PoCF, despite very weak correlations
in p(3)1 ; although p
(2)
1 and p
(3)
1 are close (with Kullback-
Leibler divergence DKL(p
(2)
1 ||p(3)1 ) = 0.0094), the likelihood
of experiencing widespread failures changes somewhat no-
ticeably. This points to possible sensitivity of PoEs to the
degree distributions, including their dependence structure,
in some cases.
7 GENERAL SETTINGS
In Section 6, we considered scenarios with two CSes and
deterministic transmission of infections, and studied how
the variability of degrees and dependence between the two
degrees of agents alter the PoEs. In this section, we return
to the general settings described in Section 3 and examine
how the degree distributions (pi; i ∈ S) shape the PoEs.
General settings pose additional challenges that we did
not have to cope with in the simpler two-CS scenarios. First,
unlike in univariate or bivariate cases, choosing a suitable
stochastic order for comparing degree distributions becomes
more problematic. The reason for this is that there are
several different stochastic orders one can consider, which
can be viewed as extensions of a single stochastic order
for univariate rvs to random vectors. Second, perhaps more
importantly, if the infection probabilities qi,j , i, j ∈ S , are
not equal to one, even when two different sets of degree
distributions (p(`)i ; i ∈ S), ` = 1, 2, can be ordered using
some stochastic order, the associated children distributions
(h
(`)
i ; i ∈ S+) are in general not guaranteed to preserve the
ordering with respect to the same stochastic order.
Consider two sets of degree distributions p(`) =
(p
(`)
i ; i ∈ S), ` = 1, 2. Let D(`)i = (D(`)i,j ; j ∈ S),
` = 1, 2, and i ∈ S , be a random vector with distribution
p
(`)
i . In order to make progress, we introduce the following
assumption on internal failure probability functions ℘ini ,
i ∈ S .
Assumption 3. Assume that φ?i : IN → [0,∞), where
φ?i (d) := d · ℘ini (d, 1), is non-decreasing and satisfies
α ·φ?i (d1) + (1−α)φ?i (d3) ≤ φ?i (d2) for all d1 ≤ d2 ≤ d3,
where α = (d3 − d2)/(d3 − d1).
Roughly speaking, Assumption 3 states that an agent
has a higher total risk of experiencing a failure (due to
the failure of one of the internal neighbors) with an in-
creasing internal degree. An example of ℘ini that satisfies
Assumption 3 is ℘ini (d, 1) = d
−β with β ∈ [0, 1]. Obviously,
℘ini (d, 1) =
∑
k ck · d−βk , where ck > 0 and βk ∈ [0, 1]
for all k, also satisfies the assumption. We point out that,
as illustrated by the example, this assumption captures the
heightened aggregate risk of failure seen by higher degree
agents, even though a single neighbor might pose less risk
(i.e., smaller ℘ini (d, 1)).
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7.1 The effects of dependence
The dependence order we adopted in the previous section,
namely CO, can be generalized to random vectors con-
sisting of more than two rvs: suppose that X and Y are
n-dimensional random vectors with n > 2. Then, X is
said to be smaller than Y in CO if FX(t) ≤ FY(t) and
F¯X(t) ≤ F¯Y(t) for all t ∈ IRn, where FX = P [X ≤ t] and
F¯X = P [X > t]. One can verify that these conditions imply
that the marginal distributions are identical.
7.1.1 Supermodular order
In our study, we instead consider a dependence order that is
somewhat stronger than CO. This is called supermodular or-
der (SMO) [32]: a function ξ : IRn → IR is called supermodular
if, for all x,y ∈ IRn,
ξ(x) + ξ(y) ≤ ξ(x ∨ y) + ξ(x ∧ y), (6)
where x∧ y and x∨ y are (min(xi, yi); i = 1, 2, . . . , n) and
(max(xi, yi); i = 1, 2, . . . , n), respectively. If the inequality
in (6) goes the other way, the function ξ is called submodular.
A random vector X is smaller than a random vector Y
in SMO (X ≤sm Y) if E [ξ(X)] ≤ E [ξ(Y)] for all super-
modular functions ξ [32]. SMO is a multivariate positive
dependence order that satisfies the nine natural properties
discussed in [32, pp. 110-111]. Furthermore, for bivariate
cases, CO and SMO are equivalent. For n > 2, however, SMO
implies CO, but they are no longer equivalent. Finally, if
X ≤sm Y, we have Cov(Xi, Xj) ≤ Cov(Yi, Yj) for all i 6= j.
The following theorem generalizes Lemma 2. We will
defer the proof of the theorem till after Theorem 2 in the
subsequent subsection.
Theorem 1. Suppose that Assumption 3 holds and D(1)i ≤sm
D
(2)
i for all i ∈ S . Let µ`, ` = 1, 2, be the PoE vector
under the degree distributions (p(`)i ; i ∈ S). Then, we
have µ1 ≤ µ2.
7.2 The effects of variability
In Section 6 with bivariate degrees, we assumed independence
of two degrees and studied the influence of variability of
each degree on the PoEs with the help of SSD (or ICV order).
In this section, we adopt a stochastic order that allows
us to examine the impact of variability with a common
dependence structure captured by what is called copula [33],
without having to assume independence.
7.2.1 Copulas
Suppose that X is an n-dimensional random vector with a
joint distribution function FX. A copula of X (or associated
with FX) is a function CX : [0, 1]n → [0, 1] satisfying
CX(FX1(x1), . . . , FXn(xn)) = FX(x) for all x ∈ IRn, (7)
where FXi is the marginal distribution of Xi, i = 1, 2 . . . , n.
For instance, a copula of mutually independent Xi, i =
1, 2 . . . , n, is a product function, i.e., for all u ∈ [0, 1]n, we
have CX(u) =
∏n
i=1 ui. Also, if FXi , i = 1, 2, . . . , n, are
continuous, there is a unique copula that satisfies (7).
It is clear from (7) that a copula of a random vector
captures most of the dependence structure properties that
do not depend on the marginal distributions. In this sense,
two random vectors with a common copula have similar
dependence structure among the comprising rvs. For a more
detailed discussion of copulas, we refer an interested reader
to a manuscript by Nelson [33].
7.2.2 Increasing directionally concave order
A function ξ : IRn → IR is said to directionally concave (DCV)
if, for all xi ∈ IRn, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, with x1 ≤ x2,x3 ≤ x4
and x1 + x4 = x2 + x3, we have ξ(x1) + ξ(x4) ≤ ξ(x2) +
ξ(x3). If the inequality goes the other way, the function is
called directionally convex (DCX). Clearly, ξ is DCV iff −ξ is
DCX. It turns out that a function ξ is DCV (resp. DCX) iff it
is submodular and componentwise concave (resp. supermodular
and componentwise convex) [40, p. 335].
Let X and Y be two n-dimensional random vectors.
Random vector X precedes Y in DCV order (X ≤dcv Y)
if E [ξ(X)] ≤ E [ξ(Y)] for all DCV functions ξ. Note that
X ≤dcv Y iff Y ≤dcx X. If the inequality is required only
for increasing DCV functions, we say that X precedes Y in
increasing DCV (IDCV) order. As expected, X ≤idcv Y iff Y
precedes X in decreasing DCX (DDCX) order (Y ≤ddcx X).
If X ≤idcv Y, then Xi ≤icv Yi for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Therefore, Yi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, are in a way more predictable
than Xi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n. As pointed out in [32, p. 135], the
DCV (or DCX) order goes one step further and allows us
to compare random vectors with a common copula, but with
different variability in the marginals. Moreover, an example is
provided to illustrate that convex order is not suitable for
this purpose.
Utilizing the IDCV order (or, equivalently, DDCX order),
the following theorem sheds some light on how the vari-
ability of agents’ degrees influences the PoEs, even when
the mean degrees stay fixed.
Theorem 2. Suppose that Assumption 3 holds and
D
(1)
i ≤idcv D(2)i with E
[
D
(1)
i
]
= E
[
D
(2)
i
]
for all i ∈ S .
Letµ`, ` = 1, 2, be the PoE vector under the distributions
(p
(`)
i ; i ∈ S). Then, we have µ2 ≤ µ1.
Proof: A proof of Theorem 2 is given in Section 8.2.
As explained before, when D(1)i ≤idcv D(2)i for some
i ∈ S , the degrees of CS i agents with the distribution p(1)i
have greater variability than with the distribution p(2)i . As
a result, Theorem 2 can be viewed as a generalization of
Lemma 1.
We are now ready to provide the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1: Recall that a function is DCX iff it is
both supermodular and componentwise convex. Thus, it is
obvious that SMO implies DCX order, hence DDCX order.
For this reason, if D(2)i ≤sm D(1)i , then D(2)i ≤ddcx D(1)i or,
equivalently, D(1)i ≤idcv D(2)i . Now Theorem 1 follows from
Theorem 2.
7.3 Comparison on the basis of children distributions
In Theorems 1 and 2, the inequalities in stochastic orders
are imposed on the degree distributions (p(`)i ; i ∈ S).
In some cases, however, it may be possible to estimate
the children distribution. If we could directly compare the
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children distributions (as we implicitly did in Section 6 for
two symmetric CSes), we can prove a stronger result than
Theorem 2.
Suppose that X and Y are two n-dimensional ran-
dom vectors. We say that X is smaller than Y in Laplace
transform (LT) order (X ≤LT Y) if E
[
exp
(−sXT )] ≥
E
[
exp
(−sYT )] for all s > 0.
One can easily show that, for every s > 0, the function
ξs : IR
n → IR, where ξs(x) = exp(−sxT ) for x ∈ IRn,
is DDCX: since ξs is twice differentiable, it is DCX iff
∂2
∂xi∂xj
ξs(x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ IRn [32, Theorem 3.12.2, p. 132].
For all i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, we have
∂2
∂xi∂xj
ξs(x) = sjsi exp
(−sxT ) > 0 for all x ∈ IRn.
Clearly, ξs(x) is decreasing in x and, hence, is DDCX. This
tells us that if X ≤ddcx Y, then X ≤LT Y.
Suppose that (h(`)i ; i ∈ S+), ` = 1, 2, are the children
distributions under degree distributions (p(`)i ; i ∈ S). Let
O
(`)
i = (O
(`)
i,j ; j ∈ S+) be the random children vector
with distribution h(`)i , ` = 1, 2, and i ∈ S+. The following
theorem holds under a much weaker condition (namely, LT
order) than IDCV order without Assumption 3.
Theorem 3. Suppose that O(1)i ≤LT O(2)i for all i ∈ S+.
Let µ`, ` = 1, 2, be the PoE vector under the children
distributions (h(`)i ; i ∈ S+). Then, µ2 ≤ µ1.
Proof: Please see Section 8.4 for a proof.
7.4 Discussion
In this subsection, we briefly discuss some of modeling
assumptions and their roles.
• Asymmetric inter-CS dependence and symmetric
intra-CS dependence – In our model outlined in Section 3,
we purposely assumed somewhat different intra-CS depen-
dence and inter-CS dependence among agents. More specif-
ically, we assumed that intra-CS dependence is symmetric,
while inter-CS dependence is asymmetric.
Suppose that the inter-CS dependence is symmetric in-
stead. Then, the inter-CS infection probabilities qi,j , i 6= j,
can be computed in a manner similar to that of qi,i, i ∈ S ,
as outlined in Section 4.2. Since Theorems 1 - 3 hold with
symmetric internal dependence, it is not surprising that the
same results hold with symmetric inter-CS dependence if
℘exj,i(d, 1), j 6= i, satisfy Assumption 3. Similarly, if the intra-
CS dependence is asymmetric, under the same assumption
that the conditional degree distributions of failed agents are
similar to the prior degree distributions pi, i ∈ S , the results
still hold. These observations suggest that our findings are
true under more general settings and are not sensitive to
specific modeling assumptions introduced in the study.
• Effects of failure probability functions – Recall that
the functions ℘ini and ℘
ex
j,i are used to model the vulnera-
bility of agents to the failures of those that support them.
It is clear from Section 4.2 that, except for Assumption 3 on
℘ini , our main findings in Theorems 1 - 3 do not impose any
other conditions on ℘ini and ℘
ex
j,i. In particular, although it is
reasonable to expect agents with larger incoming degrees to
be less susceptible to the failure of a single supporting agent,
the functions ℘exj,i need not be monotonic. This suggests that
our reported findings are insensitive to the exact choices of
these functions as long as Assumption 3 is met by ℘ini , i ∈ S .
But, we also note that this may no longer be true if the
dependence graph exhibits assortativity, i.e., the degrees of
neighbors are correlated. We do not study the impact of
assortativity here, and refer an interested reader to [23] for
a study of its influence in a single homogeneous network
with strategic agents.
8 PROOFS OF MAIN RESULTS
This section provides the proofs of our main results. A
reader who is not interested in the proofs can safely skip
the section.
8.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Let f `, ` = 1, 2, be the generating functions corresponding
to the degree distributions p(`)1 , ` = 1, 2. Using the definition
of the generating function, we obtain
f1(s) =
∑
d∈Z2+
p1(d) s
d1
3 s
d2
2 and (8)
f3(s) =
∑
d∈Z2+
p1(d+ e1) s
d1
3 s
d2
2 . (9)
The expressions for f2(s) and f4(s) can be easily obtained
using the assumed symmetry of degree distributions p1 and
p2. Recall that, from the assumed symmetry of the degree
distributions, we know µ1 = µ2 and µ3 = µ4.
Substituting µ1 for µ2 in (8) for the PoEs and using the
assumed independence of the two degrees of an agent,
µ1 =
∑
d∈Z2+
p1(d) µ
d1
3 µ
d2
1
=
 ∑
d1∈Z+
p1,1(d1) µ
d1
3
 ∑
d2∈Z+
p1,2(d2) µ
d2
1
 .
Clearly, for any fixed s ∈ (0, 1), sx is a decreasing,
convex function of x or, equivalently, −sx is an increasing,
concave function of x. Because D(1)1,j ≤SSD D(2)1,j , j = 1, 2,
we have, for all µ < 1, ∑
d1∈Z+
p
(2)
1,1(d1) µ
d1
3
 ∑
d2∈Z+
p
(2)
1,2(d2) µ
d2
1

≤
 ∑
d1∈Z+
p
(1)
1,1(d1) µ
d1
3
 ∑
d2∈Z+
p
(1)
1,2(d2) µ
d2
1
 .
Repeating the same steps, starting with (9), yields ∑
d1∈Z+
p
(2)
1,1(d1 + 1) µ
d1
3
 ∑
d2∈Z+
p
(2)
1,2(d2) µ
d2
1

≤
 ∑
d1∈Z+
p
(1)
1,1(d1 + 1) µ
d1
3
 ∑
d2∈Z+
p
(1)
1,2(d2) µ
d2
1
 .
Since these two inequalities hold for all µ < 1, we get
f2(µ1) ≤ f1(µ1) = µ1. (10)
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Corollary 2 [15, p. 42] tells us that the inequality f2(µ1) ≤
µ1 in (10) means µ2 ≤ µ1. This completes the proof.
8.2 Proof of Theorem 2
In order to prove the theorem, we will make use of the
following lemma. Its proof is provided in Section 8.3.
Lemma 3. Under Assumption 3, we have O(1)i ≤idcv O(2)i
for all i ∈ S+, where O(`)i , ` = 1, 2, is a random vector
with the children distribution h(`)i .
We know from Corollary 1 [15, p. 42] that the only
solutions of (5) in the unit cube are µ and 1. However, when
ρ(M) > 1, we have µ < 1.
Let f ` be the generating function under the children
distributions h(`) = (h(`)i ; i ∈ S+), ` = 1, 2. Then,
f1(µ1) = µ1 < 1. From the definition of the generating
function,
f1i (µ
1) =
∑
o∈Z2NS+
h
(1)
i (o)
∏
j∈S+
(
µ1j
)oj for all i ∈ S+.
Since O(1)i ≤idcv O(2)i or, equivalently, O(2)i ≤ddcx O(1)i
for all i ∈ S+, we can show f2(s) ≤ f1(s) for all s < 1
as follows: for any 0 < s < 1, define ψs : IR
2NS → IR,
where ψs(x) = exp
(−∑i∈S+ log(s−1i ) xi) . According to
Theorem 3.12.2 [32, p. 132], ψs is DCX iff ∂2ψs(x)/∂xi∂xj ≥
0 for all x ∈ IR2NS and i, j ∈ S+. Clearly,
∂2
∂xi∂xj
ψs(x) = log(s
−1
i ) log(s
−1
j ) ψs(x) ≥ 0
for all x ∈ IR2NS and i, j ∈ S+, and ψs is DCX.
Together with O(2)i ≤ddcx O(1)i and µ1 < 1, this tells us
that, for all i ∈ S+,
f2i (µ
1) = E
[
ψµ1(O
(2)
i )
]
≤ E
[
ψµ1(O
(1)
i )
]
= µ1i ,
and f2(µ1) ≤ µ1. Corollary 2 [15, p. 42] states that, if 0 ≤
f2(µ1) ≤ µ1 ≤ 1, then µ2 ≤ µ1. This completes the proof
of the theorem.
8.3 Proof of Lemma 3
We will first prove the lemma for i ∈ S and then for i ∈
S+ \ S = {NS + 1, . . . , 2NS}.
• O(1)i ≤idcv O(2)i , i ∈ S : We prove the claim using
the definition of IDCV order. Suppose that g : IR2NS → IR
is IDCV. Recall that this is equivalent to saying that −g is
DDCX. For notational convenience, for each j ∈ S , define
Oj :=
{
o ∈ Z2NS+ | oj′ = 0 for all j′ /∈ S+j
}
.
For ` = 1, 2,
E
[
g(O
(`)
i )
]
=
∑
o∈Oi
g(o) h
(`)
i (o) (11)
=
∑
o∈Oi
g(o)
 ∑
d≥d¯(o)
p
(`)
i (d)
×
∏
j∈S
(
dj
d¯j(o)
)(
q`i,j
)d¯j(o) (
q¯`i,j
)dj−d¯j(o) ,
where the mapping d¯was defined in (3), q`i,j = qi,j for j 6= i,
and q`i,i is the probability that an internal neighbor of a CS i
agent will fall victim to infection, under the internal degree
distribution p(`)i,i , which is given in (1).
We shall prove E
[
g(O
(1)
i )
]
≤ E
[
g(O
(2)
i )
]
in two steps.
First, we will show
E
[
g(O
(1)
i )
]
=
∑
o∈Oi
g(o)
 ∑
d≥d¯(o)
p
(1)
i (d)
×
∏
j∈S
(
dj
d¯j(o)
)(
q1i,j
)d¯j(o) (
q¯1i,j
)dj−d¯j(o)
≤
∑
o∈Oi
g(o)
 ∑
d≥d¯(o)
p
(2)
i (d) (12)
×
∏
j∈S
(
dj
d¯j(o)
)(
q1i,j
)d¯j(o) (
q¯1i,j
)dj−d¯j(o) .
Then, we will demonstrate that (12) ≤ E
[
g(O
(2)
i )
]
. If this
is true for all IDCV functions g, it implies O(1)i ≤idcv O(2)i
by definition.
After interchanging the order of the two summations in
(11), we get
E
[
g(O
(`)
i )
]
=
∑
d∈ZNS+
p
(`)
i (d)
×
[ ∑
o∈Oi:d¯(o)≤d
g(o)
∏
j∈S
(
dj
d¯j(o)
)(
q`i,j
)d¯j(o) (
q¯`i,j
)dj−d¯j(o)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=: g∗` (d)
]
.
Note that g∗` (d) is E [g(Y(d, `))], where Y(d, `) is a vector
consisting of NS mutually independent binomial rvs. In
other words, with a little abuse of notation, the j-th element
Yj(dj , `) is a Binomial(dj , q`i,j) rv and, hence, can be viewed
as a sum of dj i.i.d. Bernoulli(q`i,j) rvs.
In order to finish the proof of the first step, we make use
of the following lemma.
Lemma 2.17 [28]: Let
(
S
(i)
j , j = 1, 2, ...
)
be independent
sequences of i.i.d. nonnegative rvs. Suppose θ : IRm → IR is
increasing DCX (resp. IDCV). Then, ζ : INm → IR defined
by ζ(n) = E
[
θ
(∑n1
j=1 S
(1)
j , . . . ,
∑nm
j=1 S
(m)
j
)]
is increasing
DCX (resp. IDCV).
Since the function g was assumed IDCV and Y(d, 1)
consists of mutually independent binomial rvs (each of
which is a sum of i.i.d. Bernoulli rvs), the above lemma tells
us that g∗1 is IDCV. Since g
∗
1 is IDCV and, with a little abuse
of notation, p(1)i ≤idcv p(2)i , we have
E
[
g(O
(1)
i )
]
= E
[
g∗1(D
(1)
i )
]
=
∑
d∈ZNS+
p
(1)
i (d) g
∗
1(d)
≤
∑
d∈ZNS+
p
(2)
i (d) g
∗
1(d) = E
[
g∗1(D
(2)
i )
]
= (12).
This proves the first step.
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In order to prove the second step
(12) ≤ E
[
g(O
(2)
i )
]
= E
[
g∗2(D
(2)
i )
]
=
∑
d∈ZNS+
p
(2)
i (d) g
∗
2(d),
it suffices to show that q1i,j ≤ q2i,j for all j ∈ S ; if this is true,
for all d ∈ ZNS+ , Yj(dj , 1) ≤st Yj(dj , 2) for all j ∈ S , where
≤st denotes the inequality with respect to usual stochastic
order. Since Yj(dj , `), j ∈ S , are mutually independent,
Theorem 3.3.8 [32, p. 93] tells us Y(d, 1) ≤st Y(d, 2).
Because the function g is assumed increasing, this implies
g∗1(d) = E [g(Y(d, 1))] ≤ E [g(Y(d, 2))] = g∗2(d)
from the definition of usual stochastic order [32].
First, recall that q1i,j = q
2
i,j = qi,j for all j 6= i because
they are assumed fixed. Thus, we only need to show q1i,i ≤
q2i,i. Using the definition in (1),
q1i,i =
1
d
(1)
i,avg
∑
d∈IN
p
(1)
i,i (d)
(
d · ℘ini (d, 1)
)
=
1
d
(1)
i,avg
∑
d∈IN
p
(1)
i,i (d) φ
∗
i (d).
Because φ∗i satisfies Assumption 3 and p
(1)
i ≤idcv p(2)i ,
which implies p(1)i,i ≤icv p(2)i,i , we obtain
q1i,i =
1
d
(1)
i,avg
∑
d∈IN
p
(1)
i,i (d) φ
∗
i (d)
≤ 1
d
(2)
i,avg
∑
d∈IN
p
(2)
i,i (d) φ
∗
i (d) = q
2
i,i.
Recall that d(1)i,avg = d
(2)
i,avg from the assumption in the
theorem. This proves E
[
g(O
(1)
i )
]
≤ E
[
g(O
(2)
i )
]
. Since
this inequality holds for every IDCV function g (with well
defined expectations), we have O(1)i ≤idcv O(2)i .
• O(1)i ≤idcv O(2)i , i ∈ S+ \ S : First, note that if
ϕ : IR2NS → IR is IDCV, then so is ϕ∗e : IR2NS → IR with
ϕ∗e(x) = ϕ(x + e) for all e ∈ Z2NS . This follows directly
from the observation that ϕ∗e satisfies the characterization
(ii) and (iii) of DCV functions in Theorem 3.12.2 [32, p.132].
This tells us that p˜(`)i , ` = 1, 2, with p˜
(`)
i (d) := p
(`)
i (d+ei)
satisfy p˜(1)i ≤idcv p˜(2)i . The claim that O(1)i ≤idcv O(2)i now
follows from the proof of the previous case.
8.4 Proof of Theorem 3
From the definition of µ2, we have f2(µ2) = µ2 < 1. Using
the given children distributions, for all i ∈ S ,
f2i (µ
2) = µ2i =
∑
o∈Oi
h
(2)
i (o)
∏
j∈S+i
(
µ2j
)oj
=
∑
o∈Oi
h
(2)
i (o) exp
− ∑
j∈S+i
ojpi
2
j
 , (13)
where pi2j = log(1/µ
2
j ) > 0, j ∈ S+. Similarly, for all i+ ∈
S+ \ S ,
f2i+(µ
2) = µ2i+ =
∑
o∈Oi
h
(2)
i+ (o)
∏
j∈S+i
(
µ2j
)oj
=
∑
o∈Oi
h
(2)
i+ (o) exp
− ∑
j∈S+i
ojpi
2
j
 . (14)
Recall that O(1)i ≤LT O(2)i for all i ∈ S+. Thus, because
pi2j , j ∈ S+i , are all positive, we get
(13) ≤
∑
o∈Oi
h
(1)
i (o) exp
− ∑
j∈S+i
ojpi
2
j
 = f1i (µ2),
which yields µ2i ≤ f1i (µ2) for all i ∈ S . Following the same
argument starting with (14) gives µ2i+ ≤ f1i+(µ2) for all i+ ∈S+ \ S . Together, we obtain µ2 ≤ f1(µ2). Corollary 2 [15,
p. 42] now tells us µ2 ≤ µ1, completing the proof of the
theorem.
9 CONCLUSION
We investigated the impact of variability and correlations
in degrees of agents on the robustness of interdependent
systems. Our findings suggest that they both can have sig-
nificant influence on the likelihoods of having catastrophic
failures in complex systems comprising multiple heteroge-
neous systems via dependency among the agents. In partic-
ular, our results revealed that both increasing variability and
positive dependence render the system more robust against
random failures.
We are currently working to incorporate other graph
properties displayed by both natural and engineered sys-
tems, such as assortativity and clustering, and to understand
their role in the robustness of interdependent systems. Our
goal is to identify a suitable way of imposing a partial order
on the underlying dependence graphs and compare their
resilience against both random and targeted attacks.
REFERENCES
[1] R. Albert, H. Jeong and A.-L. Baraba´si, “Error and attack tolerance
of complex networks,” Nature, 406:378-382, Jul. 2000.
[2] G.J. Baxter, S.N. Dorogovtsev, A.V. Goltsev, and J.F.F. Mendes,
“Avalanche collapse of interdependent networks,” Phys. Rev. Lett.,
109, 248701, 2012.
[3] L. Blume, D. Easley, J. Kleinberg, R. Kleinberg, and E´. Tardos,
“Which networks are least susceptible to cascading failures?” Proc.
of 2011 IEEE 52nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Com-
puter Science (FOCS), pp.393-402, Palm Springs (CA), Oct. 2011.
[4] M. Bogun˜a´, R. Pastor-Satorras and A. Vespignani, “Absence of epi-
demic threshold in scale-free networks with degree correlations,”
Phys. Rev. Lett., 90(2), 028701, Jan. 2003.
[5] M. Bogun˜a´, R. Pastor-Satorras and A. Vespignani, “Epidemic
spreading in complex networks with degree correlations,” Lecture
Notes in Physics, 625:127-147, Sep. 2003.
[6] C.D. Brummitt, K.-M. Lee, and K.-I. Goh, “Multiplexity-facilitated
cascades in networks” Phys. Rev. E, 85, 045102, 2012.
[7] S.V. Buldyrev, R. Parshani, G. Paul, H.E. Stanley, and S. Havlin,
“Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks,”
Nature, 464:1025-1028, Apr. 2010.
[8] R. Cohen, K. Erez, D. ben-Avraham and S. Havlin, “Resilience of the
Internet to random breakdowns,” Phys. Rev. Lett., 85(21):4626-4628,
Nov. 2000.
14
[9] R. Cohen, K. Erez, D. ben-Avraham and S. Havlin, “Breakdown of
the Internet under intentional attack,” Phys. Rev. Lett., 86(16):3682-
3685, Apr. 2001.
[10] F. Chung and L. Lu, “Connected components in random graphs
with given expected degree sequences,” Annals of Combinatorics,
6(2):125-145, Nov. 2002.
[11] E. Coupechoux and M. Lelarge, “How clustering affects epidemics
in random networks,”’ Advances in Applied Probability, 46(4):985-
1008.
[12] J. Gao, S.V. Buldyrev, H.E. Stanley, and S. Havlin, “Networks
formed from interdependent networks,” Nature Physics, 8(1):40-48,
Jan. 2012.
[13] C. Godsil and G. Royle, Algebraic Graph Theory, Graduate Texts in
Mathematics, Springer, 2001.
[14] A.V. Goltsev, S.N. Dorogovtsev, and J.F.F. Mendes, “Percolation on
correlated networks,” Phys. Rev. E, 78, 051105, 2008.
[15] T.E. Harris, The Theory of Branching Processes, Springer-Verlag, 1963.
[16] R.A. Horn and C.R. Johnson, Matrix Analysis, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1990.
[17] Y. Hu, S. Havlin, and H.A. Makse, “Conditions for viral influence
spreading through multiplex correlated social networks,” Phys. Rev.
X, 4, 021031, 2014.
[18] X. Huang, J. Gao, S.V. Buldyrev, S. Havlin, and H.E. Stanley,
“Robustness of interdependent networks under targeted attack,”
Phys. Rev. E, 83, 065101, 2011.
[19] S. Janson, T. Luczak, and A. Rucinkski, Random Graphs, Wiley-
Interscience Series in Discrete Mathematics and Optimization, 2010.
[20] D.Y. Kenett, J. Gao, X. Huang, S. Hao, I. Vodenska, S.V. Buldyrev,
G. Paul, H.E. Stanley, and S. Havlin, “Network of interdependent
networks: overview of theory and applications,” Networks of Net-
works: The Last Frontier of Complexity, Springer, Jan. 2014.
[21] H. Khamfroush, N. Bartolini, T.F. La Porta, A. Swami, and J. Dill-
man, “On propagation of phenomena in interdependent networks,”
IEEE Trans. on Network Science and Engineering, 3(4):225-239, Oct.-
Dec. 2016,
[22] R.J. La, “Interdependent security with strategic agents and global
cascades,” IEEE/ACM Trans. on Networking (ToN), 24(3):1378-1391,
Jun. 2016.
[23] R.J. La, “Effects of degree correlations in interdependent security:
good or bad?”, IEEE/ACM Trans. on Networking (ToN), in press.
Preprint available at https://arxiv.org/abs/1704.00571.
[24] R.J. La, “Effects of degree variability and dependence on cascading
failures: a case study of two interdependent systems,” Proc. of
the 51st Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems
(CISS), Baltimore (MD), Mar. 2017.
[25] R.J. La, “Cascading failures in interdependent systems: im-
pact of degree variability and dependence,” available at
https://arxiv.org/abs/1702.00298.
[26] K.-M. Lee, C.D. Brummitt,and K.-I. Goh, “Threshold cascades with
response heterogeneity in multiplex networks,” Phys. Rev. E, 90,
062816, 2014.
[27] J. Leskovec and C. Faloutso, “Sampling from large graphs,” Proc.
of ACM Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining (KDD), Philadel-
phia (PA), Aug. 2006.
[28] L.E. Meester and J.G. Shanthikumar, “Regularity of stochastic
processes,” Probability in the Engineering Sciences, 7:343-360, 1993.
[29] M. Moharrami, V. Subramanian, M. Liu, and M. Lelarge, “Impact
of community structure on cascade,” Proc. of ACM Conference on
Economics and Computation, Maastricht (Netherlands), Jul. 2016.
[30] A.E. Motter and Y.-C. Lai, “Cascade-based attacks on complex
networks,” Phys. Rev. E, 66, 065102, 2002.
[31] A.E. Motter, “Cascade control and defense in complex networks,”
Phys. Rev. Lett., 93(9), 098701, Aug. 2004.
[32] A. Mu¨ller and D. Stoyan, Comparison Methods for Stochastic Models
and Risks, Wiley Series in Probability and Statistics, Wiley, 2002.
[33] R.B. Nelson, An Introduction to Copula, 2nd ed., Spring Series in
Statistics, Springer, 2006.
[34] M.E.J. Newman, “Assortative mixing in networks,” Phys. Rev. Lett.,
89, 208701, Oct. 2002.
[35] M.E.J. Newman, “Mixing patterns in networks,” Phys. Rev. E, 67,
026126, Feb. 2003.
[36] R. Parshani, S.V. Buldyrev, and S. Havlin, “Interdependent net-
works: Reducing the coupling strength leads to a change from a
first to second order percolation transition,” Phys. Rev. Lett., 105,
048701, 2010.
[37] R. Pastor-Satorras and A. Vespignani, “Epidemics and immuniza-
tion in scale-free networks,” Handbook of Graphs and Networks: From
the Genome to the Internet, Wiley, 2005.
[38] V. Rosato, L. Issacharoff, F. Tiriticco, S. Meloni, S. De Portcelli-
nis, and R. Setola, “Modeling interdependent infrastructures using
interacting dynamical models,” International Journal of Critical In-
frastructures, 4(1/2):63-79, 2008.
[39] C.M. Schneider, M. Tamara, H. Shlomo and H.J. Herrmann, “Sup-
pressing epidemics with a limited amount of immunization units,”
Phys. Rev. E, 84, 061911, Dec. 2011.
[40] M. Shaked and J.G. Shanthikumar, Stochastic Orders, Springer
Series in Statistics, Springer, 2007.
[41] J. Shao, S.V. Buldyrev, S. Havlin, and H.E. Stanley, “Cascade
of failures in coupled network systems with multiple support-
dependence relations,” Phys. Rev. E, 83, 036116, 2011.
[42] S.-W. Son, G. Bizhani, C. Christensen, P. Grassberger, and M.
Paczuski, “Percolation theory on interdependent networks based
on epidemic spreading,” Europhysics Letters, 97, 16006, Jan. 2012.
[43] A. Vespignani, “Complex networks: the fragility of interdepen-
dency,” Nature 464:984-985, Apr. 2010.
[44] D.J. Watts, “A simple model of global cascades on random net-
works,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United
States of America (PNAS), 99(9):5766-5771, Apr. 2002.
[45] O. Yag˘an and V. Gligor, “Analysis of complex contagions in
random multiplex networks,” Phys. Rev. E, 86, 036103, Sep. 2012.
[46] Y. Zhuang and O. Yag˘an, “Information propagation in clustered
multilayer networks,” IEEE Transactions on Network Science and
Engineering, 3(4):211-224, Aug. 2016.
